Trump's Lebanon fantasy is running smack into reality

Trump's Lebanon fantasy is running smack into reality On June 26, two official delegations — one from Israel and one from Lebanon — signed (lemonde.fr) a framework agreement with great fanfare in Washington. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, openly enthusiastic, framed the event as paving the way toward “lasting peace and security” between Beirut and Tel Aviv.A month later, President Donald Trump received Lebanese President Joseph Aoun at the White House. Once again, Rubio welcomed (lemonde.fr) the visit and reiterated the goal of disarming Hezbollah and achieving a complete and definitive peace between Lebanon and its southern neighbor.Like Tel Aviv, Rubio favors a top-down approach that centers on force and coercion. To neutralize both Tehran and Hezbollah, this camp hopes to combine strong military action against Iranian territory with maximum pressure on the government in Beirut. The goal is two-fold: to strong-arm the Lebanese government into sidelining Hezbollah and to permanently separate the Lebanese and Iranian equations.Within the Trump administration, not everyone is convinced that this roadmap is the most effective approach. Vice President JD Vance has for some time now made clear that he no longer believes (time.com) that Washington’s interests and those of Tel Aviv are perfectly aligned, and he openly favors a de-escalation on the Iranian front. While Vance has not laid out a clear vision for his ideal end state, it would likely includean agreement with Tehran to keep its allied armed groups in the Middle East — Hezbollah foremost among them — in check. Incidentally, this would help stabilize oil prices and maritime traffic in the Gulf while preventing the war against Iran from becoming even more unpopular among American citizens ahead of the midterms. In this competitive landscape, the political and media buzz surrounding the Israeli-Lebanese issue offers an opportunity to bolster the supporters of Rubio and Israel at the expense of the vice president’s apparent preferences. All the same however, the Israeli-Lebanese process has very little chance of succeeding.In Lebanon, first of all, any agreement with Israel would face several legal and constitutional stumbling blocks. The consociational system, under which authority is largely divided up between the three main communities (Sunnis, Shia, Christians), leaves the president with little executive leeway. Since the 1990 signing of the Taif Accords, which marked the end of a 15-year-long civil war, the religious communities must adhere to a distribution of powers that determines the legality of political decisions. While Article 52 of the constitution authorizes the president to “negotiate and ratify treaties,” he may do so “only in agreement with the head of government,” and ratification will be validated “only after approval by the Council of Ministers.”The problem is that no government decision is constitutionally valid unless it is endorsed by all the major communities. Since the Shia parties expressed their opposition to the terms of the framework agreement from the outset, it is difficult to consider any future agreement viable.Similarly, any peace agreement with Israel will ultimately have to be ratified by the parliament. Given the body’s current make-up, the probability that the text will be approved by a majority of members is exactly zero.The Lebanese institutional framework is not the only problem. Trust in Israeli good faith is also a highly problematic issue. On November 27, 2024, Tel Aviv and Hezbo